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UNILATERAL, ANTICOMPETITIVE ACQUISITIONS
OF DOMINANCE OR MONOPOLY POWER
AvisHALOM TOR*
The prohibition of certain types of anticompetitive unilateral conduct
by firms possessing a substantial degree of market power-variously
called "monopolists" or "dominant firms"-is a cornerstone of competition law regimes worldwide. Yet, notwithstanding the social costs of monopoly-which may include output reduction and higher prices, limited
choices for consumers, and diminished incentives for innovation'modern legal regimes refrain from prohibiting it outright. They do not
condemn mere monopoly,2 both because the rewards associated with
substantial market power stimulate competition and innovation and
since monopolies may sometimes be more efficient than their smaller
competitors.3 Instead, competition laws prohibit monopolies or dominant firms from engaging in those types of anticompetitive conduct that
amount to "monopolizing"4 or to an "abuse of dominant position."5
* Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of the Forum for Law and Markets, University of
Haifa Faculty of Law. Earlier versions of this article have benefited from the comments of
Michal Gal, David Gilo, and participants in the Issues at the Forefront of Monopolization
and Abuse of Dominance Conference at the University of Haifa (May 2009). Special
thanks are due to the Journa's editors for their many helpful comments. This article also
enjoyed the support of the Haifa Center for German and European Studies and the research assistance of Elena Reznichenko.
I See, e.g., 3 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 631, at 71 (3d
ed. 2008); seealsoJEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 63-78 (1988)

(reviewing the costs of monopoly).
2Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (stating that the Sherman
Act does not forbid mere "monopoly in the concrete").
3E.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004) ("The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is
what attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces
innovation and economic growth."). See generally 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,

631 (3d ed. 2008).
415 U.S.C. § 2.
5
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 102, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J.
(C 115) 47 (effective Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter EU Functioning Treaty]. As of December
1, 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon became effective and introduced a renumbering of the
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Importantly, anticompetitive conduct can take place
to monopoly and, later on, once substantial market
achieved. Thus, the accepted standard in the United
polizing conduct prohibits "the willful acquisition or
monopoly power 6 in reference to these two distinct
ticompetitive conduct.
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Yet the seeming parallelism between the two conduct categories of
"monopoly acquisition" on the one hand and "monopoly maintenance"
on the other is not borne out by the reality of U.S. antitrust law. To the
contrary, casual observation suggests that only a fraction of monopolization enforcement actions, case law, and scholarly discourse over more
than a century of antitrust in the United States has concerned anticom7
petitive acquisitions of monopoly rather than its maintenance.
Moreover, the emphasis on monopoly maintenance rather than acquisition in the United States is further exceeded by the European
Union's competition law regime that does not at all prohibit anticompetitive unilateral acquisitions of dominance. 8 In other words, while in the
United States some unilateral anticompetitive acquisitions of monopoly
are illegal, even if not often prosecuted or even examined, a non-dominant firm may obtain dominance through unilateral anticompetitive
conduct without risking violating European competition law.
This somewhat puzzling state of affairs may be partly attributed to
those pervasive concerns of modern antitrust regimes about the potential chilling effects of "false positives"-namely, enforcement actions
articles in the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Relevant to the discussion
here, Article 82 is now Article 102. However, for ease of reference, I will continue to use
the prior numbering in my discussion.
6United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). See also United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (discussing "any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly").
7Although quantitative evidence on this point is not readily available, the emphasis on
monopoly maintenance over its acquisition has been noted by some scholars. See Timothy
J. Brennan, Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
417,424-25 (Vivek Ghosal &Johan Stennek eds., 2007) (noting and criticizing this emphasis).
23 (Eur. Ct. Justice)
8See, e.g.,
Case 247/86, Alsatel v. Novasum, 1988 E.C.R. 5987,
(ECJ holding that potentially abusive practices are not prohibited where a non-dominant
undertaking is concerned); Case T-17/93, Matra Hacette v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 11-595,
1 123-124 (Ct. First Instance) (CFI noting, inter alia, that the achievement of dominance is not prohibited under Article 82); see generally RjcHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW
173 (6th ed. 2009) ("Article 82 applies only where one undertaking has a 'dominant position' or where two or more undertakings are 'collectively dominant."') (footnote omitted); Caries Esteva Mosso et al., Article 82, in THE EC LAw OF COMPETITION 313, 314-15
(Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay eds., 2d ed. 2007) (noting the same and explicitly stating
that "[a]rticle 82 does not prevent the mere creation .. .of a dominant position.").
OF ANTITRUST
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and judicial decisions that erroneously condemn procompetitive unilateral conduct as monopolization. 9 The limited legal attention to the unilateral acquisition of substantial market power may also stem from the
perception that its anticompetitive effects are often insignificant-given
the limited market power of its non-monopolist, even nondominant,
perpetrators. In the same vein, because successful anticompetitive conduct in traditional markets often results in incremental accretions of
market power, legal regimes may consider it sufficient to address it once
its perpetrators have reached dominance or near-monopoly.
These explanations, however, which only account for certain categories of conduct, do not justify a complete neglect of monopoly acquisition by non-dominant firms through unilateral conduct. Thus, concerns
regarding false positives are more significant for pricing behavior, for
instance, than for abuses of governmental processes.' 0 And even where
the chilling effects of false positives are significant, they must be balanced against the harms of "false negatives"-that is, of anticompetitive
conduct the law fails to prohibit." Similarly, while the harmful effects of
certain types of unilateral conduct-like tying-depend on the market
power of the firms employing them, 12 other types of conduct-such as
fraudulent patent infringement suits-may generate significant compet9These concerns have been manifested clearly in recent U.S. jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 325 (2007)
(noting the serious risk of "chilling procompetitive behavior" when Section 2 conduct
standards are set too low); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408, 414 (2004) (similar concerns cited to justify the Court's caution in
applying Section 2 to unilateral refusals to deal).
10 Compare Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
226-27 (1993) (emphasizing the importance of fashioning Section 2 standards that avoid
chilling aggressive price cutting), with ROBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 159
(1978) (stating that "[m]isuse of courts and governmental agencies is a particularly effective means of delaying or stifling competition").
11Notably, the legal discourse adopting a decision-theoretic framework in antitrust has
been decidedly one-sided, rarely voicing concerns regarding the risks of false negatives.
For two notable exceptions in the Section 2 context, see EINER ELIAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONoMics 230 (2007) ("The question then becomes what set of legal rules would achieve the optimal result by minimising the total
harm from underdeterrence and overdeterrence.") (footnote omitted), and Andrew I.
Gavil, ExclusionaryDistributionStrategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 5 (2004) (arguing that tolerant Section 2 standards may "lead to 'false
negatives. .. ").
12While the effects of tying are complex, the leading theories of anticompetitive harm
concern firms with a monopoly in the tying product market. See, e.g., Michael D. Whinston, Tying Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 837 (1990); Dennis W. Carlton &
Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and CreateMarket Power in Evolving
Industries, 33 RAND J. EcON. 194 (2002); see also Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts,
and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARv. L. REv. 397 (2009) (discussing
at length the various effects of tying and their prerequisites).
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itive harm when employed by non-monopolists, even those possessing
little market power when the conduct takes place. 13 And in contrast to
the commonly incremental increases in market power that occur in
many industries, some forms of conduct-such as the abuse of standardsetting processes and other forms of regulatory gaming-may lead to
swift transition from non-dominance to dominance and even to monopoly, 14 especially in network markets or "new economy" industries, 15 as
explained in greater detail below.
Therefore, although an expansive prohibition of unilateral acquisition conduct may well be undesirable, legislators should give careful
consideration to its potential harms before either permitting it altogether or merely posing few constraints on conduct even when it leads
or is likely to lead to monopoly. Such consideration would be particularly timely, both because lawmakers around the world increasingly
adopt the European Union's approach to abuse of dominance with its
non-regulation of unilateral acquisition conduct,16 and since new economy markets have become more important to world economies and
thus to their competition policy regimes.
To this end, this article develops an analytical framework for evaluating the legal regulation of unilateral, anticompetitive acquisitions of
dominance or monopoly power, thereby providing a more coherent account than is currently available for the extant EU and U.S. approaches
13See, e.g., 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 651f, at 123 (providing this example
for "conduct challenged as exclusionary [that] could be profitable for either a monopolist or a nonmonopolist"); see generally Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975 (2005); see also infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Creighton et al., supra note 13; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust
Law and Regulatory Gaming,87 TEX. L. REv. 685 (2009) (discussing the related notion of
"regulatory gaming" and arguing that the risk of such private behavior that exploits regulatory processes and institutions for exclusionary purposes justifies an oversight of regulated industries by the antitrust laws); see also infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
15 Some of the main characteristics of these industries include high rates of innovation,
network effects, the importance of compatibility and standardization, the centrality of IP
rights, and more. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Challengesof the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property,68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2001) (examining the hightech sector); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001)
(considering the software, Internet, and communications industries); Christian Ahlborn
et al., DG Competition DiscussionPaper on Article 82: Implications of the ProposedFramework and
Antitrust Rules for Dynamically Competitive Industries (Mar. 2006) (referring to the high-tech
and innovation industries), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=894466.
16 See, e.g., Michael W. Nicholson, An Antitrust Law Index for EmpiricalAnalysis of International Competition Policy, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1009, 1021 (2008) (noting that
.many transition economies have simply adopted language from the Treaty of Rome for
s");
ee generally Michal S. Gal & A. Jorge Padilla, The Follower
their domestic laws . .
Phenomenon: Implicationsfor the Design of Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy, infra this
issue, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 903 n.19 (2010).
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in this area. This framework also permits a critical evaluation of these
two regimes, showing how the lack of any liability for unilateral, anticompetitive, acquisitions of dominance in Europe not only leaves this
regime unable to address some harmful unilateral practices but also
leads to various distortions in its other unilateral conduct policies. Turning to the United States, this article shows its monopolization regime
suffers some significant limitations, although it is potentially capable of
addressing extreme instances of harmful unilateral conduct by non-monopolists. Finally, the analysis concludes by drawing together the lessons
from the critical evaluation of the EU and the U.S. approaches for the
appropriate design of unilateral conduct regimes worldwide.
I. THREE DIMENSIONS OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT REGIMES
If anticompetitive unilateral conduct is to be efficiently regulated, the
social harm it generates must be weighed against the costs involved in its
regulation. Competition laws may refrain from universally regulating or
prohibiting monopolies if the significant social costs of mere monopoly
are outweighed by the efficiency benefits of some monopolies, the incentives provided by the prospect of monopoly profits to market participants, and the dramatically large costs of such regulation.17 At the same
time, most legal regimes reflect the view that some anticompetitive unilateral conduct is sufficiently harmful to warrant its legal prohibition
and regulation, despite the significant costs involved.18 Yet such regulation inevitably faces the difficulty of distinguishing between anti- and
procompetitive unilateral behavior, a difficulty that in turn increases the
rate of enforcement and judicial errors, with their attendant chilling effects on beneficial competition. 19 These consequences are especially
problematic, moreover, in the case of unilateral conduct, the most common and fundamental building block of market activity.

17 See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON &JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA
TION 95-105 (4th ed. 2005) (describing the costs and benefits of monopoly); Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation, in 3
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

1557, 1605-06, 1639-40 (Mark Armstrong &

Robert H. Porter eds., 2007) (summarizing some costs and limitations of optimal monopoly regulation and simple, practical regulatory strategies, respectively).
18See, e.g., ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 11, at 235 ("Virtually all the antitrust laws
issued by the different nations cover unilateral conduct by firms holding some degree of
market power.").
19E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary
Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 345, 357 (2003) (arguing that "for now the costs of
false positives when dealing with exclusionary-practices claims seem very high-for a false
positive means we will confuse real competition with exclusion, and thus harm
consumers").
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To better address these challenges, legal regimes can vary the specific
contours of their unilateral conduct approaches within three dimensions-namely, (1) the type of conduct regulated; (2) the market power
threshold for liability; and (3) the relationship between conduct and
market power. First, they can limit the situations in which liability may
be imposed on firms to specific types or categories of unilateral conduct
or, conversely, they can impose general conduct liability but exempt limited types or categories of conduct. Such conduct-based liability can be
flexible, targeting only practices whose potential anticompetitive effects
justify intervention, and may take a variety of forms, from narrowly tai20
lored rules to open-ended standards.
As scholars have observed, unilateral conduct rules that prohibit specific, enumerated practices increase certainty and reduce the rate of
false positives. At the same time, narrow, bright-line rules that cannot
capture the complexity of dynamic markets and the ever-changing variety of anticompetitive behavior within them may fail to prevent higher
rates of false negatives.2 2 General conduct standards, on the other hand,
can make illegal any anticompetitive unilateral conduct, or certain categories thereof, without further specification. Such standards, however,
generate a mirror-view set of benefits and costs when compared to specific rules, providing flexibility and reducing false negatives, while dra23
matically increasing uncertainty and false positive effects.
20

See, e.g., GIORGIO MoNrI, EC COMPETITION LAW 16-18 (2007) (providing a basic account of the effects of rules versus standards in competition law); Daniel A. Crane, Rules
Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 81-101 (2007) (examining in depth the relative benefits and costs of rules and standards in antitrust); see
generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE LJ. 557
(1992) (providing an economic analysis of the respective costs and effects of rules versus
standards).
21 Assuming these rules are tailored to capture only anticompetitive conduct. See, e.g.,
ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 11, at 230 (suggesting that such an approach may be
reflected in the U.S. approach to price discrimination). In reality, however, since conduct
may have ambiguous competitive effects, rules that provide clear guidance regarding the
legality of behavior may still condemn benign or procompetitive conduct. Cf Crane, supra
note 20, at 84-91 (examining under- and over-inclusion in antitrust rules and arguing the
latter is a more severe problem).
2 Cf Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) ("'Anticompetitive conduct' can come in too many different forms, and is too
dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have enumerated all...
[its] varieties."). But see Crane, supra note 20, at 70 (criticizing the increasing adoption by
the courts of this and similarly spirited statements to justify the excessive use of flexible,
"post hoc decision making"), 82 (arguing that this "maxim does not make sense as applied to archetypal industrial behavior that is frequently the subject of antitrust
litigation").
23 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1984)
(lamenting the high litigation costs generated by the rule of reason standard); see also
KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAw: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAw EVOLUTION
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Of course, specific rules and general standards may be combined,
whether for unilateral conduct generally or for particular conduct types,
in an attempt to maximize the efficiency of conduct-based regulation.
When using both rules and standards, for instance, legal regimes can
vary the level of required proof, demanding more proof for standardsbased as compared to rule-based liability.2 4 In such combined regimes,
moreover, the reliance on rules may be limited, say, to a small number
of better understood classes of anticompetitive conduct.
Whether rules or standards are concerned, however, the greater flexibility of regulation within this first, conduct-based, dimension must be
traded against its implementation and error costs. Were conduct-based
regulation used alone and thus applied uniformly to all market participants, regardless of market power, these costs would have been large
indeed. It is therefore unsurprising that legal regimes commonly turn to
a second dimension of unilateral conduct regulation, limiting such lia25
bility to firms that exceed a certain market power threshold.

Within this second dimension, legal regimes can use different market

power thresholds, thereby shielding the great majority of firms from
unilateral conduct liability and its attendant chilling effects. At the most
basic level, distinguishing between above- and below-threshold firms
may be justified by the social costs associated with the very possession of
substantial market power. 26 Some unilateral practices, moreover, can

generate significant anticompetitive harm only when employed by firms
129-31 (2003) (examining the respective false negatives and false positive effects of per se
rules versus rule of reason standards). Note, however, that this effect of standards may
also reverse itself, if courts and enforcers consistently construe standards narrowly. Cf
Jordi Gual et al., An Economic Approach to Article 82 Report by the European Advisory Group on
Competition Policy 5 (GESY-Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Discussion Paper No. 82, July 2005) (arguing, when developing the case for an effects-based
approach to Article 82, that the abandonment of a form-based approach-i.e., one that is
typically based on rules-need not entail a loss of predictability and should increase consistency and reduce false positives), available at http://www.sfbtr15.de/dipa/82.pdf.
24 For instance, standards may call for proof of competitive effects at the same time that
narrower rules may demand only evidence of particular conduct, as has been the case
under the traditional per se versus rule of reason distinction in U.S. antitrust law. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE A.

SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED

HANDBOOK 217-27 (2d ed. 2006) (briefly reviewing the development of these doctrinal
categories).
25 Cf ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 11, at 230 (noting how limiting unilateral con-

duct liability "to firms with some high degree of market power" shields from such liability
the bulk of firms that might otherwise be overdeterred "and focuses on the set of firms for
which the concern about underdeterring undesirable conduct is greatest"). Some regimes
go further and employ market shares as proxies for market power thresholds. See generally
MIcHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 66 (2003) (providing

examples of market power and market share thresholds around the world).
26 See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,

631, at 71; see also TIROLE, supra note 1.
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possessing substantial power. Importantly, however, the use of thresholds will be justified despite the appreciable anticompetitive effect of
some below-threshold activities when the costs of universally regulating
unilateral conduct outweigh its benefits.
Hence, when adopting market power thresholds, legal regimes must
trade off the relevant benefits and costs of thresholds against one another. On the one hand, higher thresholds reduce the incidence of antitrust enforcement generally and false positives specifically, along with
their attendant costs, while lower thresholds tend to generate the opposite effects. On the other hand, higher thresholds-such as those employed by U.S. antitrust law-also shield the unilateral conduct of a
larger proportion of firms, sometimes even ones with significant degrees
of market power. Because they are based on the characteristics of firms
rather than their conduct, however, thresholds apply uniformly to all
types of conduct. Consequently, higher thresholds generate more instances of false negatives, especially for conduct that can be harmful
irrespective of market power.2"
Taking these tradeoffs into account, legal regimes typically combine
the important but somewhat crude use of thresholds with more flexible
conduct-based regulation. Such combinations can further reduce enforcement and error costs, moreover, by providing above-threshold
firms additional protection from antitrust liability. Yet, while the joint
use of thresholds and conduct-based regulation can assist in designing
more efficient competition law regimes, it necessarily retains the inherent uniformity of thresholds. This uniformity, in turn, generates significant social costs, since some types of behavior-for instance regulatory
gaming-can cause much harm regardless of their perpetrators' market
power.28 The anticompetitive effects of other conduct-types, such as exclusive dealing, may depend on market power yet exert significant harm
even when carried out by below-threshold market participants in some
circumstances.2 9

27The effects of thresholds also vary with their certainty. For instance, more uncertain
thresholds impose a risk on near-threshold firms and generate additional chilling effects.
29 See Creighton et al., supra note 13.
29 In the case of exclusive dealing this such harm may result from the cumulative foreclosure of a significant portion of the downstream market by more than one below-thresh-

old upstream firm. E.g., 11

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,

1821c, at 177 (2d ed.

2005). It may also occur when a below-threshold, upstream firm finds foreclosure of the
downstream market economically attractive. See Brennan, supra note 7, at 431-33 (arguing that the monopolization of a market for a complement can also be achieved by a nondominant firm acquiring the ability to target rivals or even by someone not in the primary
market at all, with harmful competitive effects).
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At times, however, a third dimension that builds on the temporal relationship between the first two dimensions can be used to structure more
efficient competition law regimes. Specifically, prohibitions of anticompetitive unilateral conduct can apply not only after a firm exceeds a market power threshold-as is commonly done when the conduct-based
and threshold-based regulation are combined-but also beforehand.
Pre-threshold regulation may be directed at the anticompetitive conduct
through which a below-threshold firm obtains, or seeks to obtain, abovethreshold market power, such as a dominant position or a monopoly. In
fact, the U.S. Sherman Act's prohibition of monopolizing conduct has
been interpreted to include the regulation of some pre-threshold
conduct.3 0
By using this third dimension, legal regimes can reach important classes of anticompetitive unilateral conduct without resorting to pure conduct-based regulation and relinquishing the benefits of thresholds
altogether. Specifically, pre-threshold regulation can address unilateral
conduct that is capable of harming competition even when employed by
firms with near-threshold or even lower levels of market power. Such
rules can also prevent those market distortions and efficiency losses that
result from the mere possession of above-threshold market power by
firms that obtained their power by illicit means.
Nevertheless, as with the other dimensions, pre-threshold regulation
is not without its enforcement and error costs. In fact, these costs are
likely to be much more significant for pre-threshold than for postthreshold regulation, since they impose potential liability on a larger set
of market participants. At the same time, however, these costs will be
more limited than the unbearable costs an extreme, threshold-free regime would have generated, yet provide competition law with an increased reach in the face of particularly harmful conduct.
Importantly, pre-threshold liability is also inherently constrained by its
causal connection to the ultimate acquisition of above-threshold market
power. It captures only unilateral conduct that led-or would have been
likely to lead if unstopped-to the acquisition of dominance or monopoly power." Of course, where market power is only likely to be acquired
yet not acquired in fact, one must also determine the degree of likelihood necessary for pre-threshold liability to attach. In general, where
30 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
31Cf 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,
803a, at 398 (noting that "[wlhen
dealing with defendants who lack monopoly power at the time of their anticompetitive
conduct, evidence of causation is particularly critical. The question is whether the challenged conduct ... has led or would lead to monopoly power").
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substantial market power was not acquired, the high costs associated
with such liability militate against demanding merely a low likelihood of
success, which would threaten altogether to eliminate the crucial screening role of thresholds. Hence, allegedly anticompetitive pre-threshold
conduct should at least be likely to lead to the acquisition of abovethreshold market power. Furthermore, competition law regimes can adjust their pre-threshold liability-and limit its costs-where abovethreshold power was not acquired in fact by demanding different levels
32
of likelihood.
The substantial costs of pre-threshold regulation can be further reduced, moreover, by making concomitant cost-reducing adjustments in
the threshold dimension. Thus, having incorporated a pre-threshold element, legal regimes can significantly reduce costs by raising thresholds,
all the while retaining a selective pre-threshold reach that can capture
unilateral anticompetitive acquisitions of above-threshold market power.
This may be illustrated by the U.S. monopoly threshold, which is higher
than its European dominance counterpart but accompanied, at least in
principle, by the compensatory use of pre-threshold monopolization
liability.
In addition to remedying some shortcomings of threshold-based regulation, a pre-threshold approach can partially solve certain problems
with above-threshold, conduct-based regulation. For example, legal regimes may find exploitative conduct by above-threshold firms socially
harmful, yet refrain from regulating it due to heightened error-related
concerns or because such conduct is expected from profit-maximizing
firms. Pre-threshold regulation, however, can partly ameliorate these
harms by limiting the legal exploitation of above-threshold market
power to those firms that did not reach their position through anticompetitive means.
All in all, therefore, by enriching the basic combination of conductand threshold-based regulation with select pre-threshold elements, competition law regimes can develop more flexible and efficient approaches
to unilateral conduct. The specific combination chosen by a given legal
system, however, should reflect both its antitrust policy preferences and
its beliefs regarding the relative benefits and costs of unilateral conduct
32
As illustrated by the requirement of U.S. antitrust law that allegations of the attempted monopolization offense show, inter alia, "a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). However, U.S. case law has incorporated a market-power threshold into the "dangerous
probability" element of the attempted monopolization offense. 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 1, 807c, at 436-41.
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rules. Part II therefore illustrates the insights provided by the three-dimensional framework through an analysis of current EU and U.S. unilateral conduct regimes.
II. A THREE-DIMENSIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON
THE U.S. AND EU REGIMES
The three-dimensional framework not only.clarifies the relationship
among different elements of unilateral conduct regimes, but also highlights the special role of pre-threshold liability within this model. Specifically, a superficial, two-dimensional comparison of the U.S. and EU
regimes may suggest they use dramatically different approaches to unilateral conduct regulation generally and anticompetitive market power
acquisitions specifically. A three-dimensional perspective, however,
reveals the differences between the two regimes to be less pronounced,
if still significant.
When considering only the first two dimensions-of conduct- and
threshold-based regulation-the U.S. unilateral conduct regime appears
far more permissive than its EU counterpart.3 3 Commentators have offered various explanations for this systematic difference based on the
two regimes' diverging values and beliefs. That is, modern U.S. antitrust
law sees its mission as the protection of efficient markets and the competitive process. While sharing these concerns, the EU's regime, on the
other hand, is also driven by fairness considerations and sometimes
seeks to protect individual competitors as well as competition writ
34
large.
33 See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, What Is Competition? A Comparison of U.S. and European
Perspectives, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 29, 40-53 (2004) (also noting that the divergence between the two regimes is most apparent in the area of dominant firm regulation); Keith
N. Hylton, Section 2 and Article 82: A Comparison of American and European Approaches to
Monopolization Law 7 (Law & Economics Working Paper No. 06-11, May 2006) ("Viewed in
light of the American experience, Article 82 reflects a less conservative, more interventionist approach toward antitrust law."), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=902655; see also Michal S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 343,
345-46 (2004) (making this observation in the context of monopoly pricing). But see
ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supranote 11, at 234 (arguing that despite appearances "[t]he European conduct standard may... be more lenient than some of these [U.S.] standards and
tougher than others").
34 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization andDominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness,61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 981, 983-85
(1986) (also discussing the different historical background and paths of the two regimes);
Gal, supra note 33; Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals, and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 ANTITRUST
L.J. 443, 454-61 (1996) (comparing the goals and policies of the U.S. and EU dominant
firm regimes); see also Mosso et al., supranote 8, at 315-16; MoNTr, supra note 20, at 20-52
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These value differences are reinforced, moreover, by the two regimes'
differing beliefs, for where the current U.S. approach emphasizes the
costs of false positive and their effects on markets, 5 the EU is also concerned about the risks of false negatives and underdeterrence.3 6 Furthermore, the U.S. regime reflects a greater degree of faith in the ultimate
efficacy of markets on the one hand and the severe limitations to beneficial governmental intervention on the other. The balance of judgment
embodied in its EU counterpart, however, is very different, revealing
stronger faith in the potential of government action and a weaker belief
37
in the power of market forces alone to generate efficient results.
Together, the regimes' differences of value and belief shape their respective policies. With regard to conduct-based regulation, U.S. antitrust
law only prohibits firms with substantial market power from engaging in
behavior that is exclusionary.38 At the same time, the European Union
holds firms liable for abuse of dominance for conduct-such as excessive pricing-that merely exploits their dominance without maintaining
or extending it.39
Moreover, beyond imposing liability on dominant firms for an additional category of conduct, EU competition law gives a significantly
broader meaning to its prohibition of exclusionary abuse.40 Thus, EU
competition law holds that a dominant firm "has a special responsibility
not to allow its conduct to impair undistorted competition on the com(respectively providing summary and detailed reviews of the core values of Article 82 and
European competition law).
35See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312,
325 (2007); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
408, 414 (2004).
36
E.g., Hylton, supra note 33, at 9 (stating, when discussing predatory pricing that
"[t] he American approach puts a great deal of weight on the costs of false convictions....
The European approach puts more emphasis on the costs of false acquittals."). This is
reflected, for instance, in the often-repeated statement of the European Court of Justice
that a dominant firm "has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impairgenuine
undistorted competition in the common market." Case 322/81, Michelin v. Comm'n, 1983
E.C.R 3461,
57 (Eur. Ct. Justice) (emphasis added).
37 E.g., Gal, supra note 33; Kolasky, supra note 33.
38 See, e.g., 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,
650a, at 90 (stating that in "the
monopolization offense, the relevant conduct is often described as 'exclusionary'.. .").
39 E.g., Mosso et al., supra note 8, at 348 (stating that "[it is now established that...
[Article 82] covers both exclusionary and exploitative practices by dominant undertakings"); Rhodri Thompson & John O'Flaherty, Article 82, in BELLAMY & CHILD EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAw OF COMPETITION 909, 952 (Peter Roth & Vivien Rose eds., 6th ed. 2008)
(explaining that Article 82 encompasses both exclusionary and exploitative abuses).
40See, e.g.,Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 34, at 487-512 (reviewing the broader scope of
liability for abuse generally and specific practices in the areas of pricing and refusals to
deal in the European Union as compared to the United States).
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mon market."41 Consequently, EU liability for exclusionary conduct may
attach even to acts that only harm specific competitors of the dominant
firm rather than distort the market as a whole. 42 Furthermore, this generally expansive approach to exclusionary conduct has also led the European Union to construe specific types of exclusionary conduct-such as
predatory pricing or bundled rebates-more broadly than the compara43
ble offenses in U.S. antitrust law.
Finally, the basic structure of Article 82 combines an open-ended prohibition on abuse of dominant position with a rule-like list of specifically
enumerated examples of abuses. 44 These examples, while not exhaustive, impose liability for certain forms of dominant firm behavior, such
as unfair pricing and trading conditions, price discrimination, tying, and
more. 45 In the United States, in contrast, the common-law, open-ended
monopolization standard of Section 2 incorporates no explicit rule-like
elements. 46 And although over time the U.S. courts have developed
41Michelin, 1983 E.C.R 3461,

1 57.
See Mosso et al., supra note 8, at 348 (stating that the European Union's "early approach has often been to protect the economic freedom of other players in the market;
particularly competitors," while noting the ongoing debate about the justification of this
approach); id. at 351-52 (noting that the elimination, sometimes even only the weakening, of a single competitor sufficed for a finding of abuse by the European Court of Justice, occasionally even where the concerned conduct was "not at all likely to affect market
structure and, therefore, the degree of competition in the market"); MONTI, supra note
20, at 173 (observing that "[t]he most common concern in EC competition law has been
practices that force rivals out of markets and/or prevent the entry of new rivals"); WHIsH,
supranote 8, at 191 (noting that "[c] ritics of the way that Article 82 is applied in practice
often argue that it has been, and is, used to protect competitors, including inefficient
competitors, rather than to protect competition."). But see the more recent approach reflected in the European Comm'n, DG CompetitionDiscussion Paperon the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, 1 54 (2005) [hereinafter DG CompetitionDiscussion
Paper] (stating that "it is competition, and not competitors as such, that is to be protected"), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.
pdf.
43See, e.g., Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 34, at 487-512 (comparing pricing practices
and refusals to deal in the European Union and the United States); Hylton, supra note 33,
at 7-9 (same).
44The abuses enumerated in Article 82 cannot be considered rules in a strict sense,
both because they contain open-ended, standard-like elements, such as "unfair" prices,
and since they all require varying degrees ofjudgment and classification of different conduct elements. Cf Crane, supra note 20, at 71-80 (discussing the inherent indeterminacy
and malleability of antitrust rules, focusing on the example of the per se prohibition of
price fixing in the United States and concluding that liability still differs significantly depending on whether "rules" or standards are employed).
45See, e.g., VALENTINE KoRAi, AN INTRODUCrORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE 135 (9th ed. 2007) (describing the list of examples in Article 82).
46Thus, Section 2 makes it illegal to "monopolize" without providing further detail (15
U.S.C. § 2), having left the courts to give concrete content and structure to the offense
over time. See William F. Adkinson, Jr. et al., Enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
Theory and Practice16 (FTC & Dep't ofJustice, Working Paper on Section 2 Hearings, Nov.
42
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many detailed and complex doctrines, their fundamental values and beliefs have led them, at least in recent decades, to restrict the exclusion47
ary conduct liability of monopolists rather than to expand it.
The systematic differences between the two regimes are also apparent
in the second, threshold-based dimension, where the U.S. approach
again appears more permissive than its European counterpart. The standard EU definition of dominance is "the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently."4 On the other hand, to be of concern for
monopolization law in the United States market power must be "both
49
substantial in magnitude and durable.
These somewhat different definitions translate in practice to significantly diverging market share thresholds, with U.S. precedent suggesting a lower bound of at least 50 percent, and typically more-in the
range of 70 percent and above-before a firm will be deemed to possess
3, 2008) ("Section 2's brief language offers little guidance in identifying prohibited conduct. Rather than defining its central concept-'monopolize'-the statute leaves that task
to the courts. Their analysis has evolved over time, reflecting changes in business practices
and market characteristics and the evolution of economic thinking."), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/section2overview.pdf; see also Crane, supra note
20, at 66 ("Monopolization law has always been more flexible and fact-sensitive.... Section 2 .. .contains no clear target [for adjudication] because all of a firm's amorphous
conduct may be relevant to answering the question whether it unlawfully monopolized.")
47
Thus, one review summarizes this dynamic as follows:
Generally, the trend has been towards shrinking the scope of section 2 liability,
and giving dominant firms more leeway in pricing, product development, and
other business strategies. This shrinkage has occurred virtually across the spectrum of section 2 offenses, as economic thinking and legal learning has cast
doubt on the more interventionist approach of earlier years.
Adkinson et al., supra note 46, at 16 (citation omitted). See also William E. Kovacic, The
Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago!
HarvardDouble Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 3 (noting this development since the
1970s); id. at 14-15 (stating that "[t] he double helix of [Chicago/Harvard] ideas does not
preclude enforcement, but it has supported the creation of presumptions that elevate the
hurdles that antitrust plaintiffs must clear to prevail in the courts").
48Case 27/76, United Brands v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207,
65 (Eur. Ct.Justice) (defining dominance as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by
giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors,
customers and ultimately of its consumers"). More recently, however, this definition increasingly has been linked to a requirement of substantial market power. See, e.g.,
DG
Competition Discussion Paper, supra note 42,
28 (explaining that the standard definition
translates, in the case of single dominance, as "whether [the allegedly dominant undertaking] holds substantial market power").
492B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,
501, at 111 (3d ed. 2007) (further explaining that "[flor antitrust purposes, therefore, market power is the abilities (1) to price
substantially above the competitive level and (2) to persist in doing so for a significant
period without erosion by new entry or expansion"). One may, however, also find older
precedents referring to "the power to control prices or exclude competition." United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
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the substantial degree of market power required by the law. 50 The EU
definition, on the contrary, has been interpreted to include even firms
with market shares slightly below 40 percent, 51 with an actual presumption of dominance for firms with shares of 50 percent and higher.52
Hence, a significant portion of those firms that exceed the EU dominance threshold do not meet the U.S. threshold for substantial market
power.
Altogether, therefore, a basic comparison of the two regimes within
the first two dimensions reveals that the United States takes a consistently more restrained approach to unilateral conduct regulation than
the European Union does. In other words, the theoretical potential of
the two dimensions to compensate for one another, such that a competition law regime might balance higher thresholds with more expansive
conduct-based liability and vice versa, does not appear to have material53
ized in fact.
50

For instance, Areeda & Hovenkamp suggest:
Although one cannot be too categorical, we believe it reasonable to presume the
existence of substantial single firm market power from a showing that the defendant's share of a well-defined market protected by sufficient entry barriers has
exceeded 70 or 75 percent for the five years preceding the complaint. Most recent
cases dismiss claims as a matter of law where the defendant's market share is less than 50
percent.

3B

AREEDA

& HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 1 801a, at 383 (emphasis added).

51See generally WHISH, supra note 8, at 46, 177-79; Thompson & O'Flaherty, supra note
39, at 925-29 (reviewing references to market share levels in various cases). In one case,
in fact, the CFI found dominance with a share of 39.7 percent. See Case IV/D-2/34.780Virgin/British Airways, Comm'n Decision, 2000 O.J. (L 30) 1. While in another case, the
Court of Justice noted that an undertaking with market shares between 32-36 percent
"may, depending on the strength and number of its competitors, be considered to be in a
dominant position, [although] those market shares cannot on their own constitute conclusive evidence of a dominant position." Case C-250/92, Gottrup Klim v. Dansk Landbrugs, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5641,
48 (Eur. Ct. Justice).
52 See Case 62/86, AKZO Chemie v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359,
60 (Eur. Ct. Justice). Notably, moreover, "very high market shares provide in themselves virtually conclusive proof that a firm is dominant." Mosso et al., supra note 8, at 324-25 (briefly reviewing
relevant cases). In the United States, on the other hand, courts may find no monopoly
power for high market shares in the presence of easy entry. 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 1, 532, at 242-51 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the relationship between market
share and power). Cf U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines § 3 (1992, rev. 1997) (explaining that high market shares may be of little concern when the federal agencies evaluate horizontal mergers in the face of easy entry,
stating that "[i]n markets where entry is that easy (i.e., where entry passes these tests of
timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency), the merger raises no antitrust concern and ordinarily requires no further analysis."), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/
horizmer.htm.
53 Of course, the employment of both higher thresholds and narrower conduct definitions, or vice versa, may be explained by a regime's extreme concern about the costs of
false positive or negatives, respectively.

ANTITRUST LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 76

Yet a separate study of the U.S. and EU law on unilateral, anticompetiive acquisitions of market power would have suggested that the two regimes had reversed their respective approaches, with the United States
employing a more interventionist policy and the European Union altogether refraining from regulating such conduct. Section 2 prohibits not
only the maintenance of monopoly power but also its acquisition and
even its attempted acquisition.14 Article 82, on the other hand, only prohibits the abuse of an extant dominant position, remaining silent re5
garding the means by which firms have reached their dominance.
However, the three-dimensional framework suggests that the isolated
study of either the unilateral conduct policies of the two regimes regarding the first two dimensions-of conduct- and threshold-based liability-or their seemingly reversed attitudes to anticompetitive market
power acquisitions is incomplete. Instead, an examination of the three
dimensions together reveals, first, that the differences between the U.S.
and the EU approaches to pre-threshold liability are less dramatic than
they initially appear; and, second, that the regimes' respective policies
regarding this third dimension also compensate for some limitations of
their conduct- and threshold-based liability policies.
In the first place, the EU regime's more expansive approach to conduct- and threshold-based liability partly compensates for its lack of any
pre-threshold liability. 56 Moreover, those already dominant EU firms
face more extensive regulation under the abuse of dominance framework than under the U.S. monopolization prohibition. The EU approach also applies to all dominant firms, while the United States
addresses only the unilateral conduct of the limited subset of these firms
that reach its higher threshold for substantial market power. Hence,
when considering the pre-threshold approaches of the two regimes to54See 15 U.S.C. § 2. U.S. firms acquiring or attempting to acquire substantial market
power through anticompetitive means therefore face potential antitrust liability for their
conduct, irrespective of their behavior later on. U.S. antitrust law, moreover, imposes
potential liability on some non-monopolists that have attempted, yet failed, to obtain monopoly power through anticompetitive means. Liability for attempted monopolization requires: "(1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with
(2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). See generally 3B
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ch. 8B, at 403-63 (reviewing the law of attempt to
monopolize).
55
E.g., WHISH, supra note 8; Mosso et al., supra note 8.
56Thus, many firms that clearly cross the EU dominance threshold-such as most of
those with market shares greater than 50 percent, and even some of those with lower
shares-do not reach the U.S. monopoly threshold. The unilateral conduct of these
firms, therefore, is subject to the full panoply of abuse regulation under Article 82 that
already deems them "dominant," making questions of acquisition conduct superfluous.
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wards dominant firms in light of their thresholds and conduct-based liability policies, one finds not a reversal but rather a reflection of their
typical attitudes, at least where the unilateral conduct of mid-range,
dominant firms is concerned.
At the same time, the U.S. prohibitions of monopolization and attempted monopolization by non-monopolists also serve partly to compensate for the limited constraints posed by this regime on extant
monopolies. Thus, by imposing potential liability on a narrow subset of
those firms that acquired or almost acquired substantial market power
through anticompetitive conduct, the U.S. approach can both deter
some harmful conduct and provide a remedy for its most extreme
consequences.
As shown in Part I, moreover, the partial compensation provided by
this pre-threshold policy also has the distinct advantage of addressing
the acquisition of substantial market power with its attendant social
costs, precisely in those cases where its social benefits are least significant. This advantage is especially important for the U.S. approach, with
its more permissive post-threshold policy.
Notwithstanding its benefits, pre-threshold liability in the United
States is severely constrained in theory, and even more so in practice.
On the theoretical level, the monopolization offense captures, at best,
only extreme conduct, consciously leaving some instances of anticompetitive unilateral conduct by non-monopolists outside its reach. 57 And the
attempted monopolization offense has been narrowly construed by the
courts, mainly due to false positives concerns, and therefore expands
5
pre-threshold liability only to a limited, if non-negligible, extent.

57

Thus, the Court noted in Spectrum Sports- "Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny
of single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the competitive
zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur." Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)). As one treatise
comments, "[I] t is ...clear that no matter how blatantly anticompetitive the conduct, there is
no attempt offense if the defendant's position in a contestable market impeaches all possibility of monopolization." SULLIVAN & GPIMES, supra note 24, at 151 (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added). Note that if the acquisition of substantial market power were a prerequisite for anticompetitive effects no anticompetitive unilateral conduct would be left out.
58

See, e.g.,
Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. 447; see also 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,

807d, at 441 (noting that "[t]he trend in more recent decisions is to impose significant
minimum market share requirements on the attempt offense"). See also discussion in note
32 and accompanying text.
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In practice, moreover, pre-threshold monopolization liability has not
been commonly imposed in recent years.5 9 First, due to the structure of
Section 2 and its jurisprudence, the same doctrines are applied to postand pre-threshold conduct. 6° Therefore, pre-threshold conduct is subject to the same narrow definitions employed by U.S. monopolization
law more generally. Where attempted monopolization is concerned,
moreover, conduct-based liability is defined even more narrowly than
post-threshold. 61 Second, the requirements of specific U.S. exclusionaryconduct doctrines-which explicitly or implicitly demand substantial
market power-are almost never fulfilled where non-monopolists are
concerned. For instance, predatory pricing doctrine implicitly demands
such power by making the estimated likelihood of predation's success
depend, in part, on the perpetrator's market power. 6 Naturally, therefore, such requirements are unlikely to be fulfilled by any except monopolists. Finally, the effects of the narrow definitions of monopolizing

59See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 24, at 152 ("claims of attempt to monopolize are
frequently married to monopolization claims . . ."); Adkinson et al., supra note 46, at
Appendix Table 2 (collecting private Section 2 actions between 2000-2007 and finding,
inter alia, that of the 539 total cases identified for the period, 61.6 percent concerned
attempted monopolization and 74.0 percent concerned claims of monopolization). However, a simple citation search shows no subsequent appellate history of attempted monopolization case citing the Court's Spectrum Sports decision in 1993.
0 See, e.g., Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2000)
(explicitly adopting the accepted exclusionary conduct formula for monopolization in
examining an attempted monopolization claim); 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,
806a, at 412 (asserting that "the same basic definition of exclusionary conduct should
apply to both monopolization and attempt claims") (footnote omitted).
61As a leading treatise notes, while conduct legal for a monopolist is necessarily legal
for a non-monopolist (3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 806d, at 416-23), conduct that is illegal for a monopolist may in fact be legal for its non-monopolist counterpart. Id. I 806e, at 423-26.
62 See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,
728, at 98-105 (explaining that the
recoupment requirement in predatory pricing cases cannot be satisfied by firms that do
not possess a monopoly or at least a near-monopoly); id. at 102 (even suggesting "a strong
presumption that Sherman Act predation is unreasonable at market shares below 60 percent"). Similarly, the illegality of tying arrangements-typically examined under Section 1
of the Sherman Act-requires, inter alia, possession of market power. See, e.g.,
Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11-14 (1984) (suggesting that the power in
the tying product market "to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a
competitive market" is necessary for competitive harm); 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, EINER
ELHAUGE & HERBERT HOVENKAMp, ANTITRUST LAw
1734, at 35-52 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining that market power is necessary but not sufficient to generate the potentially detrimental effects of tying); see also Elhauge, supra note 12 (providing a recent review of
tying doctrine and theory). Importantly, those cases of "technological tying" that are missing some of Section l's doctrinal elements (such as the agreement requirement) can be
deemed exclusionary under Section 2, yet their harmful potential may still depend on the
perpetrator's market power. See, e.g., C.R. Bard v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Section 2 liability for the technological redesign of a biopsy gun to accept only
defendant's needles); see generally 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,
777, at
300-15.
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conduct and the market power elements of specific exclusionary conduct doctrines are reinforced by those pervasive concerns about the undesirable effects of false positives that permeate unilateral conduct
policy in the United States. 63
Altogether, therefore, an analysis of the two main competition regimes shows their respective approaches to pre-threshold liability can be
better understood in light of their main conduct- and threshold-based
liability choices. Importantly, it also reveals how these regimes adjusted
their third-dimension, pre-threshold liability-albeit with only partial
success-to compensate for other limitations in their unilateral conduct
policies.
III. THE EU AND U.S. APPROACHES: A CRITICAL EVALUATION
The analysis in Part II showed that, to be properly understood, prethreshold liability regimes are best examined in the context of the
broader unilateral conduct policy within which they are situated. This
analysis also revealed how the extant EU and U.S. pre-threshold liability
regimes and their main unilateral conduct policies partly compensate
for each other's limitations. However, the specific regulatory choices of
these regimes should be evaluated in light of their respective values and
beliefs and the policy tradeoffs involved.
Of the two approaches studied here, the three-dimensional framework poses the most obvious challenge to the EU regime. The problem
is that its broad above-threshold liability cannot reach even the most
harmful anticompetitive unilateral conduct of below-threshold,
nondominant, firms. At the same time, however, the European Union's
avoidance of pre-threshold regulation is necessary, since the cost of imposing liability below its already-low threshold to reach some nondominant firm conduct would have created an unacceptable risk for such
firms. Nonetheless, the inherent limitations of uniform threshold-based
approaches leave the European Union without the means to address
some classes of nondominant firms' anticompetitive conduct, as explained below.
These limitations are of little concern for those forms of unilateral
conduct that require significant market power to cause appreciable
harm-such as most exploitative abuses and some classes of exclusionary conduct. Yet other forms of anticompetitive unilateral conduct, like
63

E.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 325
(2007); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408,
414 (2004).
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those involving deception or abuse of governmental processes, do not
require market power to generate their effects. 64 And while capturing all
such behavior is impractical, given the ubiquity of unilateral conduct,
the EU approach provides only limited tools for addressing even its most
egregious manifestations where nondominant actors gain substantial
65
market power by anticompetitive means.
The most common category of such anticompetitive conduct likely is
"cheap exclusion." 66 Typical examples of cheap exclusion include opportunistic behavior in regulatory settings-such as where drug companies "game" the system for approval of generic drugs to extend the
exclusivity of branded ones; tortious conduct, including fraud or misrepresentation, toward other market participants or consumers; and the
abuse of governmental processes-from standard setting to various
6

forms of legislation.

1

Cheap exclusion can occur in traditional markets, for instance where
an aspiring monopolist tortiously prevents competitors' products from
reaching consumers. 68 It is often more attractive in dynamic technology

markets, however, due to a number of related reasons: First, many markets in which research, development, and innovation are of paramount
importance, such as pharmaceuticals and communications, are heavily
regulated. Consequently, a successful manipulation of the regulatory
framework can provide stable and durable market power. 69 Second, in
many new-economy markets-such as the computer hardware or communications industries-opportunities for effectively abusing either gov64See, e.g., Creighton et al., supra note 13.
65

This is illustrated by the allegations that Rambus, a non-dominant firm, monopolized
certain computer memory markets through deception in a standard-setting process.
Rambus Inc., FTC Docket No. 9032, Opinion of the Commission, at 98-114 (Aug. 2,
2006) (Rambus Comm'n Opinion), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/
060802commissionopinion.pdf, rev'd & remanded, Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456,
(D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009). Somewhat ironically, however, in the
European enforcement actions against Rambus, which followed the U.S. one, the European Commission was able to obtain a significant remedy against the allegedly monopolizing firm by reaching beyond the limitation imposed by the legal framework of Article 82
and its jurisprudence described in this article. See infra note 75.
66 Creighton et al., supra note 13; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 14.
67 Creighton et al., supra note 13, at 977-78 (reviewing these forms of cheap exclusion);
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 14, at 709-29 (discussing a number of forms of regulatory
gaming).
68
E.g., Conwood Co. L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing use of misrepresentations and abuse of trust by misusing a category manager position to "dupe" retailers and to "exclude rivals' products").
)9See, e.g., Creighton et al., supra note 13, at 983-85 (discussing the "Orange Book
Cases," which concerned attempts to game the regulatory regime controlling the approval
of generic drugs under the Hatch-Waxman Act); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 14, at
709-17 (analyzing pharmaceutical product hopping).
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ernmental or private standardization processes abound because of the
common need for compatibility and standardization and due to high
switching costs.70 Third, in these technology markets, intellectual property rights-most notably patents-often play a central role. A successful
abuse that brings an industry standard under the control of a patented
technology, for example, can therefore result in a durable market power
acquisition.7'
As its name signals, moreover, cheap exclusion typically requires the
investment of only limited resources in the relevant deceptive, tortious,
or otherwise opportunistic behavior. In fact, some forms of cheap exclusion may be more attractive to small, nondominant firms than to their
dominant counterparts. For instance, large established firms might
avoid abusing industry standard-setting processes for fear of similar conduct by their rivals. Small firms (or firms that do not manufacture in the
relevant market), on the other hand, can gain much from a patent holdup of the entire industry, while risking only a relatively small harm from
similar conduct by rivals.7 2 Hence, cheap exclusion is particularly attractive to nondominant firms compared to other forms of anticompetitive
conduct, posing a real risk, especially in dynamic technology markets,
that remains unaddressed under the Article 82 regime.
In recent years, with cheap exclusion gaining increased salience on
both sides of the Atlantic, the European Commission has occasionally
tried to address the pre-threshold gap within its extant framework. In
one case, for example, it suggested that cheap exclusion by way of a
"patent ambush" that captures an industry standard may be addressed
by post-threshold rules.73 According to this approach, conduct-based
rules prohibiting exploitative abuses may be used to impose special restrictions on a dominant firm that reached its position by anticompeti70

E.g., Rambus Comm'n Opinion, supra note 65, at 98-114.

71 Id.
72 This is illustrated by Rambus. Id. In that case, defendant Rambus's business model
depended on patent royalties. Id. at 7 ("Rambus is not a manufacturing company; rather,
Rambus earns its revenue through the licensing of its patents."). The other, larger industry participants, on the other hand, were likely to have held relevant patents but did not
seek to enforce them due to their mutual desire to have an open industry standard, as
reflected in their behavior and the organization's policies alike. Id. at 52-59.
73See Press Release, European Comm'n, Commission Confirms Sending a Statement of
Objections to Rambus (Aug. 23, 2007) (Memo/07/330) (where the Commission confirmed it sent a. Statement of Objections (SO) to Rambus that outlined the Commission's
preliminary view that Rambus violated Article 82 "by claiming unreasonable royalties" for
the use of its patented technology that had been adopted by the industry. The release
further explains the Commission's position that "without its 'patent ambush,' Rambus
would not have been able to charge the royalty rates it currently does.").
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tive means.14 Besides its limited efficacy, 75 however, and much like the
other ad hoc responses to the European Union's lack of pre-threshold
liability, such an approach contradicts both the language and spirit of
Article 82 and its jurisprudence, which do not discriminate among dom76
inant firms based on the causes of their market power.
Monopolizing conduct by nondominant firms may take a number of
other forms, as well, some of which require significant financial resources, but not market power in the monopolized market. 77 A large
multi-product firm, for example, may seek to monopolize a market
where it is not currently dominant, as part of an overall strategy vis-,-vis
other multi- or single-product firms in either the monopolized market
or related ones. Examples of such strategies include predatory pricing,
which requires deep pockets but not extant market power in the monopolized market; the foreclosure of access to vertically related markets
by extensive exclusive dealing arrangements, which may make a profita7
ble, if costly, investment; and more. 1
In these cases, Article 82's lack of a prohibition against anticompetitive acquisitions of market power is problematic, since the perpetrating
firm may not possess above-threshold market power in the market where
74

Id. See also Philip Lowe, Director General, DG Competition, Remarks at Conference
on Pricing and the Dominant Company: The Commission's Current Thinking on Article
82, at 6-8 Uan. 31, 2008); Lars-Hendrik R6ller, Exploitative Abuses, in European COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 525, 528-29 (ClausDieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2007) (identifying potential gaps in the enforcement of Article 82 and recommending the use of the prohibition against exploitative
abuses specifically to close the gap resulting from the exploitation of dominance that was
reached by exclusionary means).
75 These legal limitations notwithstanding, the Commission has recently succeeded in
leading Rambus to propose it will place a five-year price cap on relevant royalty rates by
threatening an enforcement action that goes beyond the boundaries imposed by Article
82. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Commission Market Tests Commitments Proposed by Rambus Concerning Memory Chips (June 12, 2009) (Memo/09/273) (release
inviting interested parties to present their comments regarding the proposed commitment by Rambus).
76 Cf Damien Geradin, Pricing Abuses by Essential Patent Holders in a Standard-Setting Context: A View from Europe 13-18 (July 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1174922 (arguing that Article 82's prohibition against exploitative abuses is generally a poor means for determining ex post whether a given patent royalty rate is excessive or unfair); But see Inge Govaere, In Pursuit of an Innovation
Policy Rationale:Stakes and Limits under Article 82 TEC, 31 WORLD COMPETITION 541, 549-51
(2008) (noting the inability of Article 82 to undo pre-threshold conduct while supporting
the legitimacy and desirability of regulating the ex-post exploitation of dominance).
77 See also IOANNIS KoKKooRs, A GAP IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 82 (2009) (arguing there is a gap in the enforcement of Article 82, where nondominant firms may cause
consumer harm by exploiting their superior economic power or market position in their
contractual relations).
78 Cf Brennan, supra note 7.
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the conduct is taking place. At times, EU law has responded to this difficulty by imposing liability on the unilateral conduct of dominant firms
even for conduct outside the market which they dominate.7 9 At other
times, the Commission and the courts strove to define relevant markets
narrowly, to bring those firms suspected of unilateral anticompetitive
80
conduct above the already-low EU threshold requirements.
While providing an ad hoc solution in some cases, however, these remedial efforts are in tension with the language and logic of Article 82;
they are also of limited efficacy. The first solution-namely, reaching
conduct in related markets-only addresses those related markets and
cannot capture the conduct of large multi-product firms that are significant players in many markets but dominate none. The second solution-that is, defining relevant markets narrowly-is not only
analytically problematic but also likely to be increasingly ineffective in
practice, given the Courts' move towards greater reliance on economic
analysis of markets, an approach that does not condone unsustainably
8
narrow market definitions. '
79This approach was taken, for example, by the Court of First Instance in the Tetra Pak
case and subsequently confirmed by the Court ofJustice on appeal. Case T-83/91, Tetra
118-122 (Ct. First Instance) (noting such
Pak Int'l v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 11-755,
imposition of liability "can only be justified in special circumstances"), affd, Case C-333/
27-31 (Eur. Ct. Justice). See also
94P, Tetra Pak Int'l v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5951,
Mosso et al., supra note 8, at 344-45 (briefly reviewing related cases); Thompson &
O'Flaherty, supra note 39, at 937-39 (reviewing relevant cases and noting that "there is an
established and developing jurisprudence applying the prohibition of abuse of dominance to a range of situations where an undertaking enjoys market power on one market
but exercises that power in a way that influences conditions of competition on a related
market."). Importantly, such imposition of liability for related-market conduct is in addition to its more common application in vertically related markets. See, e.g., id. at 937 (providing some examples). One might reasonably argue, however, that the condemned
conduct in the related market may have been employed, inter alia, to maintain the perpetrators' dominant position in their "main" market.
80 See, e.g., WHISH, supra note 8, at 188 (discussing examples of narrow market definitions). But see KORAH, supra note 45, at 114 (arguing that since the 1980s the European
Court of Justice started suggesting wider market definitions). Notably, this strategy is of
lesser concern where the anticompetitive conduct must continue after the firm crossed
the dominance threshold in the narrowly defined market.
81 Cf Peder Christensen et al., Mergers, in THE EC LAw OF COMPETITION 421, 425, supra
note 8 (explaining, in the context of merger regulation, that the increased number and
complexity of cases, the greater specialization of the competition bar, and the increased
scrutiny and annulment of Commission decisions by the Court necessitated an increased
reliance, inter alia, on an economic analysis of the cases). The Commission has stated it is
moving towards a more economic (or effects-based) approach in the Article 82 area as
well, citing its actions in Wanadoo (Case C-202/07 P, France T6l6com SA v. Comm'n, 2009
O.J. (C 141) 2 (Eur. Ct. Justice)), Microsoft (Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n,
2007 E.C.R. 11-3601 (Ct. First Instance)), and Telef6nica (Case T-336/07, Telef6nica &
Telef6nica de Espafia v. Comm'n, 2007 O.J. (C 269) 55) as manifesting this approach.
Thus, in its most recent policy statement in this area the Commission repeatedly refers to
the centrality of consumer harm in its analyses:
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Another challenge to the EU approach is posed by network effects,
where the utility of the product to consumers increases with the number
of consumers purchasing the good.8 2 In markets with strong network
effects, such as where the operation of technology requires compatibility, consumers may face significant switching costs when moving from
one supplier to another. Consequently, network markets sometimes exhibit a lasting "tipping" towards one supplier or technology. Before tipping, we may observe attempts to win the competition for the market by
multiple nondominant competitors. After tipping, however, only one of
these competitors would possess substantial market power.8" Of course,
acquisitions of market power in a tipping market often result from the
superiority of a given supplier or technology. But when obtained
through the anticompetitive conduct of nondominant firms they are
outside the reach of Article 82.
Turning to the U.S. regime, which appears less subject to criticism
given its incorporation of pre-threshold liability, the present framework
nevertheless highlights some areas of concern. Specifically, the current
U.S. approach, which combines pre-threshold liability with both high
market-power thresholds and more limited conduct-based liability, does
not reach most unilateral conduct of below-threshold dominant firms.
In practice, moreover, casual observation suggests that pre-threshold liability is rarely imposed on U.S. firms where monopoly power has been
acquired, and even more so where only attempted monopolization is
84
alleged.
Some of the U.S. reluctance in this area may be justified by this regime's values and beliefs regarding the respective benefits and costs of
In applying Article 82 to exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, the
Commission will focus on those types of conduct that are most harmful to consumers.... The Commission, therefore, will direct its enforcement to ensuring
that markets function properly and that consumers benefit from the efficiency
and productivity which result from effective competition between undertakings.
European Comm'n, DG Competition, Communicationfrom the Commission-Guidanceon the
Commission's Enforcement Prioritiesin Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7,
5 (Dec. 3, 2008). See also Josef
Drexl, Real Knowledge Is to Know the Extent of One's Own Ignorance: On the Consumer Harm
Approach in Innovation-Related Competition Cases, supra this issue, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 677
(2010) (criticizing the Commission's new approach).
82See generally Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Effects of Antitrust and Intellectual
Property Law on Compatibility and Innovation, 43 ANrITRUST BULL. 609 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. Re-v. 479
(1998).
83
E.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 105-06 (1994) (describing "tipping" as "the tendency of one
system to pull away from its rivals in popularity once it has gained an initial edge.").
84See discussion and sources supra notes 54, 57-58 and accompanying text.
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market power on the one hand and antitrust enforcement on the other.
Yet the three-dimensional framework reveals that even an assertive use
of pre-threshold liability only partly substitutes for the limitations imposed by a regime's main unilateral conduct policy choices. And the
rare application of pre-threshold liability in the United States suggests
its compensatory benefits may fail to materialize altogether, potentially
leaving this regime excessively exposed to harmful monopolizing practices by below-threshold firms.
IV. INCORPORATING PRE-THRESHOLD LIABILITY
The analysis in Part III revealed how a regime without pre-threshold
liability may suffer distortions in its other unilateral conduct rules in its
attempt nevertheless to reach correct decisions in specific cases. In the
European Union, for instance, the pre-threshold gap has partly contributed to distortions in the interpretation and application of Article 82,
ranging from market definitions that are unjustifiably narrow, through
the imposition of liability on dominant firms in markets where they were
not dominant, to the discriminatory application of the prohibition on
exploitative abuses based on the means by which a firm obtained dominance. Such distortions, however, may lead to unsound competition policy and fail to provide a direct and effective substitute to ajudicious prethreshold regime.
At the same time, even regimes that include pre-threshold rules in
their unilateral conduct arsenal may not exploit its full potential. This
can happen either due to a failure fully to recognize the interplay
among the three dimensions of unilateral conduct policies or due to the
challenges involved in developing appropriate conduct-based rules for
pre-threshold liability. The United States, for example, for these reasons
has used its prohibition of anticompetitive monopoly-creating behavior
in the monopolization and attempted monopolization offenses only to a
limited degree. That is, not only have acquisitions of monopoly remained less studied, but insofar as such behavior has been scrutinized, it
was subjected to the same conduct-based rules applied to other monopolizing behavior. These rules, however, often incorporate-explicitly
or implicitly-market power requirements that render them largely irrelevant in the pre-threshold arena.
Therefore, competition law regimes outside the European Union and
the United States that seek to develop an efficient approach to unilateral conduct regulation would do well to take into account both the
theoretical insights of the three-dimensional model and the lessons provided by the extant approaches of these two leading regimes. The EU
experience suggests it may be unadvisable to rule out pre-threshold lia-
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bility completely, even for a regime that is willing to lower thresholds
and expand conduct-based liability. To incorporate such liability to any
degree without creating unacceptable chilling effects on unilateral conduct, however, a regime must also avoid employing excessively expansive
conduct-based rules or low thresholds. These lessons are particularly
timely, moreover, given the increasing adoption of EU-like abuse of
dominance regimes worldwide.
In addition, the U.S. approach shows the potential of pre-threshold
liability, especially when it remains an active enforcement element,
partly to compensate for less-interventionist choices of unilateral conduct policy more generally. However, the design of pre-threshold liability should feature conduct-based rules that capture those monopolizing
behaviors that remain problematic even when carried out by initially
weaker, below-threshold firms. Finally, given the dangers of an excessively broad pre-threshold reach, an assertive use of pre-threshold liability for actual monopolization will greatly benefit from a concomitantly
restrained imposition of liability for attempted acquisitions of dominance or monopoly power, given the risks such liability poses for a
broad swath of firms that never reach market power thresholds.

